Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Why Does God Allow Evil and Suffering?

Chances are if you are a living/breathing/cognitive human being you have either heard it asked, been asked, or you yourself have asked the question “if God is so good and loving then why does he permit evil?”  There are many generic answers to this question of evil (also known as theodicy) that are often more harmful than helpful.  These range from God allows bad things to happen for a reason -to- it is part of His plan -to- suffering is God’s mercy in disguise- and even to- in God’s sovereign ways (or perhaps diabolical plan) He has predestined some for good and some for bad and then judges each according to how he made them to be (no cynicism towards Calvinism here).  Nevertheless, one’s worldview tends to frame how they understand and answer the question, so perhaps we need to reframe our view.  Greg Boyd has done some of the most concise work that looks at scripture’s constant interplay between God working toward the good of the world, while both humanity and some in the angelic realms work more against God’s will than for it.  In Satan and the Problem of Evil, Boyd outlines probably the best model for this warfare theodicy which I have adopted into my own theology and essentially outlined here. So here it goes:

1.  Love must be freely chosen: While this may seem contrary to rational thought, the allowance for evil begins with the nature of love.  If we can agree on the assumption that we are to be participatory agents in God’s love then love by definition is not legitimate if humans or angels are programmed like machines to have it. Rather, it requires all to be capable of a certain amount of self-determining freedom to choose or reject it.[1] 

2. Freedom suggests risk: The very idea that the participatory agents have the freedom to accept or reject love means that the future to some degree is open for God. The story of Jonah (and likewise for many of the prophet’s messages) shows an open future in that God sends Jonah to warn Nineveh that unless they change they will be destroyed due to their continuous wickedness. This carries implications for the possibility of painful risk for God that while He is in control of the final outcome He has to some extent relinquished absolute control of His agents for the sake of having relationship with them.[2]

3. Risk requires moral responsibility: Risk implies that we are not just free agents, but also moral agents who can be held accountable for how we use our freedom.  For better or for worse we become responsible for our actions toward one another and thus in many ways responsible for each other.[3]

4. Moral responsibility implies the principal of proportionality and its ability to influence: This is to say that because our moral responsibility comes in our capacity to bless and our capacity to curse it will always carry the same potential and proportion for evil as it has for love.[4]  This gives way for the constant mistreatment of others or self as we often see in our daily life and experience. 

5.  The power of influence is irrevocable: It is not as if the perpetual destructiveness carried out by the world’s rebellious agents is working for God’s or human’s greater good. Rather, God has allowed it to continue because to revoke our ability to influence would unhinge our moral responsibility that remains central for relationally-mutual love.[5]

6. The power to influence is finite: While humans and angels have the irrevocable self-determining freedom and moral responsibility to influence, it does not stipulate the scope or duration of that freedom.  In a sense the quality of freedom will cut both ways given that God’s creatures are finite and God is omnipotent. There are plenty of scriptural implications illustrating that God will not allow those who misuse their freedom to eternally continue as the time will come when Christ will return to set all things right.[6]




[1] Gregory A. Boyd. Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy(Downers Grove, IL; InterVarsity Press 2001), 53-56.
[2] Ibid, 115.
[3] Ibid, 165.
[4] Ibid, 169-170.
[5] Ibid, 181.
[6] Ibid, 190-191.

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